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The data from more than 25 years of research into self-recognition in non-human primates indicate that, when given experience of their own reflection in a mirror, only individuals of the great ape species show signs of self-recognition: that is, chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, bonobos, Pan paniscus, orang-utans, Pongo pygmaeus, and gorillas, Gorilla gorilla (see chapters in Parker et al. 1994) . Species of monkeys that have been tested for self-recognition include rhesus, stumptail, longtail, pigtail, Japanese and Tonkean macaques (Macaca sp.), mandrills, olive and Hamadryas baboons (Papio sp.), tufted and white-faced capuchin monkeys (Cebus sp.). None of them has ever shown convincing evidence that it recognizes itself according to any objective and acceptable criteria for self-recognition (Anderson 1984 (Anderson , 1993 (Anderson , 1994 Gallup 1987 Gallup , 1994 . Self-recognition is an important topic in comparative and developmental psychology because of its relation to self-awareness and social cognition (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn 1979; Gallup 1982 Gallup , 1991 Povinelli 1987; Parker et al. 1994) . Converging data point towards a phylogenetic discontinuity between great apes and humans on the one hand, and the remaining non-human primates on the other, in the capacity to become self-aware and in theory of mind skills.
There has recently been lively debate concerning methodological and theoretical aspects of selfrecognition research with non-human primates (e.g. Mitchell 1993 and commentaries; Heyes 1994 Heyes , 1995 . Consequently, the literature has been carefully reviewed and new empirical data have been presented to reinforce both the validity of previous studies and the hypothesis of a great ape-monkey divide in self-recognition ability (Gallup et al. 1995; Povinelli et al. 1997) .
A Claim for Self-recognition in Tamarins
Recently, Hauser et al. (1995) claimed to have shown evidence of mirror self-recognition in some individuals of a small New World monkey species, Saguinus oedipus, the cotton-top tamarin. This claim requires careful scrutiny. If the reported results are valid and reliable, they will imply methodological inadequacies in most if not all previous studies that have tried to find mirror self-recognition in monkeys. Furthermore, they would also fatally challenge the widely accepted view that members of the great ape species and humans are the only primates with a sufficiently integrated awareness of self to allow mirrormediated self-recognition (Gallup 1982 (Gallup , 1991 Povinelli 1993) . Here, we argue that the evidence presented by Hauser et al. (1995) to suggest that cotton-top tamarins recognize themselves in a mirror is so inadequate as to be invalid. In so doing, we point out several basic conceptual and methodological considerations that need to be addressed in any attempt to find mirror self-recognition in monkeys.
